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| Zama |
Throughout history, there have been a few defining battles that have changed the course of Western civilisation. Consider Alexander the Great’s success at the battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC which destroyed the Persian empire. The battle of Tours in 732 AD ensured that Europe, apart from Spain, would remain Christian. There are other battles to contemplate. But in my opinion, the battle of Zama (202BC), as far as Western civilisation is concerned, is THE defining battle, the battle that determined that Western civilisation would be based upon Roman culture and values.
To understand this pivotal event in history it is important to understand the crucial events which led up to this famous battle enacted on the north African plain. What follows is a brief sketch of those cardinal events.
In 400 BC the Mediterranean was ruled by the superpowers of the age, the Greeks and Carthaginians. The Greeks were a loose ‘confederation’ of independent city-states, although often at war with each other, the states were bound together by culture, language and an abiding sense of superiority. With the rise of Macedonian power under Philip II (359-336 BC), the privilege of Greek independence was curtailed. The fragmentation of Alexander the Great’s Empire after his death in 323 BC resulted in political chaos and civil war within the Macedonian Empire. By the time of the First Punic war, in 264 BC, Macedonian power in Greece had waned and had been replaced by the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. Although to be fair it is difficult to chart the shifting alliances and wars in the region, at this time.
To the west on the north coast of Africa, Carthage dominated the scatter of Punic city-states. Although the cities were nominally independent, the great city of Carthage welded the greatest power ensured by a large fleet and a mercenary army. The Greeks and Carthaginians squabbled mightily and often (580-264 BC). Most of the fighting occurred on the island of Sicily where both powers had colonial offshoots. Into the mix came Rome. In 270 BC, after a series of bitter conflicts, Rome had taken control of the Italian peninsula. In 264 BC the city of Taranto on the coast of Sicily appealed to Rome for help in a conflict with the city of Syracuse. Rome accepted the challenge and removed the Carthaginian garrison by force (tis a long story, go read). Inevitably, this led to a war between these powers. The war continued for 23 years with many shifts and turns of fortune. In the end, Carthage was totally defeated and as a consequence lost her possessions in Sicily and was required to pay a hefty indemnity to Rome. An uneasy peace existed between these nations but further conflict was inevitable (compare with the First and Second World Wars two thousand years later- the parallels are uncanny).
In 218 BC the mighty Hannibal Barca provoked a war with Rome and crossed the Alps to bring battle to the Romans on Italian soil. This was a bold strategic move by Hannibal, a move with grave risks. While on Italian soil Hannibal was able to maintain a tactical advantage and exploit his position throughout the 16 years he remained on Roman soil. Hannibal was a captain of immense genius and resilience and although he inflicted several major defeats on the Romans he was unable to break up the Roman confederation from which Rome gained her political and military strength. After 16 years, Hannibal was recalled by Carthage as Roman forces had invaded North Africa. On Carthaginian soil, the Romans had already inflicted two defeats on the Carthaginians before Hannibal’s arrival and were about to invest Carthage. After 16 years of war, Hannibal’s army was in a poor state. Carthage had failed their greatest general by keeping him chronically short of men and supplies. Before his return to Africa, Hannibal due to lack of transportation had to leave his horses behind, a resource, whose loss he would rue in the battle to come. And so, on a day in October 202 BC, Hannibal’s makeshift army of 40,000 came across Rome’s veteran army of 35,000 commanded by Rome’s greatest general, Scipio Africanus. Although Hannibal had the larger army he lacked a large cavalry arm and his troops were of uneven quality. In contrast, Scipio commanded infantry well seasoned in war and he was endowed with the finest cavalry of the day. The battle was lost before it began and Hannibal and Carthage were forced into a humiliating peace. Fifty-five years later the city of Carthage was burned to the ground by the Romans and only one great power remained supreme in the Mediterranean.
So why is the battle of Zama the most important battle in history for Western civilisation? Well, that is a good question, I’m glad you asked (wibble nuts). The destruction of Carthaginian power had enormous ramifications for Western culture. It has been estimated that Hannibal was responsible for the death of 250,000 Roman soldiers; only Rome could sustain such losses and win. With the destruction of Carthage, Western Civilisation and its subsequent development would be based on rugged Indo-European Rome and not lush, Semitic Carthage. Hannibal’s enterprise was doomed before it started and the battle of Zama had been lost centuries before it was fought.
Do my readers agree with my analysis? I would welcome opinions as a basis for subsequent discussion.
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| Scipio Africanus in realistic repose |
How do you think things would have developed if Hannibal has won?
ReplyDeleteGreat comment, Mr S- I'll get back to you.
DeleteSorry for the delay. The reply was not a small endeavour.
DeleteAnyway, in support of my thesis, please consider the following:
If Hannibal had managed to dislocate the Roman confederation then Rome would have dissolved into a city state among other city states in Italy. Rome’s political and military power would have been destroyed and Rome’s status as a ‘Great Power’ would be no more. Please note, Hannibal did not have to invest and destroy Rome to achieve his goal.
The other power in the Mediterranean (Macedonian/Greeks) would likely be content, as always, to continue to fight amongst themselves thus dissipating their joint power. Even if unification could be achieved, akin to Alexander’s rule, I think interest and military effort would be directed to the east. At this time, Alexander’s gains in the far end of the Eastern empire required military intervention to keep them in line. Furthermore, the Greeks were no fools. To the east lay riches beyond compare. Therefore, in the unlikely scenario that the Greeks ‘get their act together’, I truly think they would concentrate on the East and not the West.
A win over Rome would allow the Carthaginians to consolidate their colonial gains in Spain. Between the first and second Punic war, the Carthaginians perused an aggressive military stance in Spain exploiting the country’s mineral wealth and recruiting the hardy Iberians into their mercenary armies. The Carthaginians seemed to have had little trouble in subduing the southern Spanish tribes. I think without Rome to consider, the Carthaginians could have concentrated on subduing the whole Iberian peninsular. A project well within the power of the Carthaginians. The rest becomes highly speculative but, I think, worthy of consideration. Further expanse across the Pyrenees would be inevitable into the land of the Gauls. Remember, Caesar was able to subdue the whole of Gaul within a few years. This is not to say the conquest was easy. Indeed, the Gauls put up a majestic fight. However, the Gauls were not organised into a nation and there military tactics and arms were inferior to those of the Carthaginians. It is not unreasonable to see how the Carthaginians could become the masters of Western Europe. The subsequent development of history from this position I will consider no more. Enough to say that the development of Western culture and civilisation would have been vastly different to a Europe that developed under Roman orders.
That's the basis for a great alternative-history novel. And no Saracens in western Europe?
ReplyDeleteWhat a great idea for a historical novel- would you like to write it Mr S?
DeleteYes but I don't know enough. Whereas you with your knowledge of rape and pillage...
ReplyDeleteAlas, I must leave the rape and pillage to my bastard and legitimate sons.
DeleteAs Maharbal said , “Hannibal, you know how to gain a victory, but not how to use one.”
ReplyDeleteAfter Cannae, Rome was essentially defenseless . All Hannibal needed to do was besiege the city and starve them out .
He had an even better chance to do just that in 217 , following his victory at Lake Trasamine .
Apparently , Hannibal was a genius as a tactition ( exceeded only , perhaps, by Scipio Africanus ) , but a terrible strategist . He was, however, head and shoulders above the rest of the Cartaginian generals, who seem to have been univerally incompetant .
Great question. I think Hannibal not only a master tactician but an even greater stategist and I’ll explain why. Hannibal’s greatest asset was his men. They were a mixed bunch of mercanaries and Carthiginian soldiers. They were tough, experienced and tactically flexible and they were devoted to their general. But there was never enough of them. When Hanibal arrived in north Italy he had 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. It is true that after the skirmish at Ticinus he atracted thousands of Gaulish troops. However, the Gauls were capricious, quarelsome and could not be relied upon. It is interesting that Hannibal always placed his Gauls in the first rank of battle. The point: his experienced reliable troops were not numerous and subject to wastage. Carthage never really supported their successul general being content to send troops and resources to strategically uninportant theatres. He maintained his army in hostile territory for 16 years. During that time Rome raised 750,000 soldiers.
DeleteHannibal was not prepared for siege warfare. Remember Hannibal stormed towns, but cities he obtained by ruse (Capua). Rome was not helpless after Cannae. It is estimated that Rome, the city, of the time had a garrison of 20,000 soldiers. If Hannibal decided to invest Rome after Cannae he faced numerous problems. Firstly, he lacked the equipment for a siege. Even if he had a siege train the walls of Rome were formidable. Also, Romans always applied the dictum: ‘men defend walls; not walls defend men’. Thus, he would be under constant harrassing attacks from Rome’s garrison. He would have to rely on starving the city out. This could take years if he could form a complete perimeter and prevent supplies reaching Rome. This is a lot of work and he would have to disperse his army. Also, Rome could be supplied by the river Tiber. As Hannibal lacked naval forces he could not prevent this. Secondly, Hannibal was in hostile territory in which he needed to feed his army by foraging. An army on the march through hostile territory can find new forage, but once confined to a single region they would quickly denude local resources. Thirdly, the Romans would not be idle. They would be raising new legions and diverting soldiers from other theatres, if necessary. Therefore, the Romans could concentrate ‘new’ armies and ‘old’ armies on the static Hannibal. Generally Hannibal was very careful to prevent this by utilising his mobility. The Romans could surround Hannibal if he remained at Rome and he would reliquinish his tactical flexibility and superiority. The Romans did not even have to risk battle. They could harras from a position of numerical strength and prevent provisions from reaching Hannibal. At best he would have to give up the siege and try to break through to open country. Not easy under the circumstances. This would also result in a loss of prestige. Not only by his men but also potential allies in the Italian penninsular. This brings me to the last point. Hannibal appreciated his weakness and Roman strengths. He never intended to destroy Rome because this was beyond his power. He had to destroy the Roman confederation from which Rome derived her strength and her men. It is a testament to the resilence of the confederation and Roman political strength that Hannibal, although he managed to cause the defection of a number towns and communities, the Latin towns and communities remained steadfast. His major success was in inciting the defection of Capua. The core of Roman power remained.
He failed in his goal but this should not detract from Hannibal’s tactical and strategic brilliance. Hope this makes sense. You might want to read other posts on this topic.
https://flaxensaxon.blogspot.com/2015/12/cannae.html https://flaxensaxon.blogspot.com/2014/04/hannibal-barca.html