Consciousness: Part I

Prove It

The problem of consciousness is fundamental to our personal experience, and the nature of consciousness is indeed a highly fraught topic that has no clear consensus between contemporary scientists and philosophers. It is in this murky pool that I have decided to dabble/paddle. Initially, and prior to diving a little deeper, I had fairly clear ideas concerning the problem. After a little research and reading, I'm not so cocksure. The subject of 'Consciousness' is a difficult pond in which to splash, and the waves are high. In blog format, I've decided to break up the topic into bite-size, blog-friendly pieces. Therefore, this first post is introductory. There is much to say, and, again, using the pool analogy, I might be in deep, dark waters that are way over my head.

Let's Begin

The Problem of Consciousness has occupied philosophers for over 2,000 years. Recently, scientists have had the temerity and audacity to enter the arena that was once the preoccupation of idle gentlemen. The study went from thinking very hard about the problem, as assigned to pure thought dynamics, to scientists applying the wretched 'Scientific Method'. And this has been the case for the last two hundred years or so. Regardless of methodology, the question remains: What do we mean by the term 'Consciousness', and can we understand consciousness wholly in terms of the physical? Or do we need to separate the physical world from the mind and conscious realm? Thus, we seem to have two intellectual approaches to the problem.

The majority of neuroscients fall into the 'physical camp'. The claim is that the brain is the sole/soul seat of the mind. Without a brain, a human, or any cognitive creature for that matter, cannot experience the world, and consciousness disappears along with the loss of the pineal gland. Consciousness is due to the action of neurotransmitters and neuronal connections, multivarious. At the fundamental reductionist level, consciousness is a consequence of ions passing between 'gates' present in neural tissue. However, there are those whose physical austerity is unyielding who propose that, ultimately, the mind is best understood at the quantum level. They may have a point. Knowing what we know concerning the unpredictability of the 'Quantum World', there may well be an explanation as to why my car keys keep vanishing from the last place I left them.

Philosophers, at least since Descartes, focus on the subjective experience of 'Consciousness'. We can only know our own subjective experience and infer that similar processes happen in others. However, there can be no certainty with this approach. Perhaps those around us are automatons without consciousness of any sort. Their actions are automatic and not driven by cognition. As the spectator, we interpret their actions as evidence of volition. But we observe a correlation which is interpreted as causation. Also, there is the brain in the vat problem. All before us could be an illusion, although a very persistent one. We observe and, apparently, 'feel' phantasms of our own mind, perhaps; certitude eludes us, it seems. As Descartes invariably and rightly noted using his method of Cartesian doubt, the one thing we can be absolutely certain of is our own mind. From that base, he built up the tangible world, at least to his own satisfaction. If we push this idea too far, we invite the spectre of solipsism. Intellectually, solipsism represents a philosophical dead end. It stands irrefutable, sterile and utterly outlandish.

The ancient Greeks invented the mind/body problem or duality, in which physical things were different from mental things. This idea persists today, especially among philosophers. Descartes believed that the pineal gland mediated a connection between the body and mind. He chose this small, unassuming gland in the brain as the 'connecter' for obscure and silly reasons. Even great men can have a bad 'intellect day'.

Today's philosophers and a minority of neurobiologists reject the physical hypothesis, the idea that consciousness resides completely within our neural tissue. Physical reductionists believe that eventually, given enough time and analysis, we will be able to discover how consciousness arises from the myriad of electrical connections within the brain. Dr Julia Mossbridge, a bona fide neuroscientist, believes that consciousness is not derived from physical matter at all. She considers that consciousness is primary and all else inferred. In other words, consciousness causes materialism. I can't help thinking that Julia has left the world of science and is now dabbling in mysticism; she admits that she is a little 'woo-woo'.

Dr David Chalmers holds qualifications in mathematics, science, and philosophy and showed precocious savant behaviour at the age of ten. The point is that David is appropriately educated and undoubtedly a very smart man. He has a theory (Panpsychism) that consciousness is a fundamental property like mass and gravity. He argues that reductionist physicality can never get to the heart of the problem. While it is true we can observe neural networks in the brain firing in concert with a specific conscious behaviour, these two events represent correlation. And even more damning: while eventually, we may be able to assign all brain activity to specific behaviours, it still doesn't explain the subjective experience of consciousness. The subjective character of experience defies reductive analysis. It could be argued that automata infused with an electronic analogue human brain could perform all the movements and behaviours of a human but feel nothing. This is the view of the philosopher Thomas Nagel in his 1974 paper: 'What is it like to be a bat'. I invite my readers to seek out this learned piece; tis a riveting read. After reading Nagel's work I do confess that the man has a point.

Due to my training, I have always considered consciousness in terms of the scientific reductionist hypothesis. Any talk of body/mind dualism seemed nothing more than an extension of Plato's discredited sophistry. Grudgingly, however, I have been forced to think anew due to the complexity and subtly of the problem. I have not yet abandoned my previous stance, but I'm certainly open to plausible alternatives. Dr Christof Koch takes 'Panpsychism' and extends the property to all matter, living or not. Consciousness pervades all. However, it is not equally divided in all. For instance, humans are endowed with the highest degree of consciousness, while a mouse has a lot less. This even extends to the quantum level, where atoms receive a very small amount of consciousness. The wheels of the train of rationality have long since fallen off, along with the train of thought. Frankly, I'm not convinced of Koch's vision of reality. The likes of David Chalmers have a less radical thesis and one that I'm willing to contemplate. I keep an open mind on the topic and await further enlightenment that I suspect will never come.

As mentioned, this post is only an introduction to a difficult and dense subject. In the next post, I would like to explore why and how consciousness evolved in animals. Nuff said for now.

Bugger, did anyone notice the dozy mistake in the last paragraph? Updated and rectified, akimbo!