Anabasis

The Anabasis by Xenophon

This historic, epic tale is not well known outside the dusty cloisters of acadaemia. This is inexplicable to me, as it is a rip-roaring, rollicking story worthy of the attention of Hollywood moguls. Then again, considering their previous attempts to place ancient history on celluloid, it is best if they leave well alone. For instance, does anyone remember the film Alexander, starring Colin Farrell? Nuff said.

I recommend either reading the book or, as I did, listening to the audiobook produced by Librivox. It takes just over nine hours but is well worth the trouble. I heard as I lay supine (double redundancy) adorned with ear pods in a darkened room, engulfed by the narrator's dulcet tones. My third enrouged (not a real word) nipple poked precariously through a tiny rent in my nightshirt and wobbled in accordance with the cadence/rhythm of the recital. 

The Setting

In 401 BC, Cyrus The Younger rebelled against his brother, the Persian king, Artaxerxes. He gathered an army of perhaps 20,000, which included 10,000 Greek mercenary troops. At the battle of Cunaxa, near Babylon, Cyrus was killed by a javelin to the head, and the battle ended with a victory for Artaxerxes. During the battle, Cyrus' Greek mercenaries suffered few casualties but had a significant problem. They were bereft of benefactor and were stranded 1,000 miles from home. At this point, the leaders of the Greek host decided to treat with the enemy. Treachery befell the Greek generals, who were captured and sent back to Babylon for execution. This bold move left the Greeks leaderless and in despair. At this desperate point, a mid-ranking officer named Xenophon took control and exhorted the men to strike for their homeland.  

Anabasis or 'Forward March'

The Greek force was mainly composed of heavy infantry (hoplites), with a number of Cretan archers, Rhodian slingers, and others. They faced the daunting task of travelling 1,000 miles through enemy-contested rugged terrain. In addition, they had scant supplies and would have to rely on plunder and barter to obtain sufficient food for themselves and fodder for the animals. Xenophon and his merry band were in a difficult position, indeed. Obtaining necessary supplies was only one of their problems. The Persians were not too happy about an army of Greek mercenaries roaming at will through Persian-controlled territory. Therefore, the satraps whose land they travelled were compelled to contest their journey and set forth to destroy the Greeks. In this respect, they failed. Even though the Greeks were subject to severe attack, they managed to maintain cohesion and remained an effective fighting force throughout, even after incurring severe losses. Not only did the host have to face Persian troops under the wily and treacherous satrap Tissaphernes, but even when left unmolested by Persian regulars, they faced attacks by barbarians hoping to gain plunder and slaves. The Greeks ultimately prevailed, and after much tribulation and extreme hardship, 6,000 made it to the safety of Trabzon on the Black Sea coast.

Many years after the event, Xenophon put stylus to papyrus and wrote about the escapade in simple but engaging Attic Greek prose.   

I'm not going into detail about this remarkable journey, but I want to offer brief commentary concerning the implications and consequences for the Persian Empire in the aftermath. Again, I exhort my readership to go forth and immerse themselves in this monumental and fascinating tale of men overcoming and succeeding amidst severe hardship and privation.

It did not go unnoticed by the Greeks and others that the passage of these bold and doughty warriors through Persia could not be stopped by the mighty Persian empire and the 'King of Kings'. In previous contests between the Greeks and Persians (Persian, Greek wars 5th century BC ), the Greek hoplite system had established superiority over the mainly light infantry displayed by the Persians. The triumphant march of the 10,000 reinforced hoplite battlefield dominance and uncovered grave weaknesses within this apparently mighty empire. The Greeks muttered: ''If the Persians cannot overcome a small Greek force, what would happen if faced by a mighty host''. Thus, the Persian king and his armies were nowhere as formidable as formerly believed. 

Many landless Greek troops, battle-hardened and honed by the Peloponnesian war (431-404 BC), were clambering for foreign adventure. If only they could coalesce under one unified command. In that case, they would represent a formidable force. However, that was not to be for reasons, mainly political. No doubt, the political scene was complex and convoluted. The fierce independent mentality of the Greek city-state did in no way align with pan-Helenic unity. The city-states formed loose alliances for military defence or aggression as expediency demanded. However, these alliances were fragmentary and liable for disruption if self-absorbed petty grievances or alternative opportunities arose. Athens and its allies jockeyed to increase their empire and thwart Spartan hegemony. The self-destructive war that followed (Peloponnesian war) ended with a Spartan victory. Spartan dominance was short-lived, however, and Spartan power was forever broken at the battle of Leuctra, which ended in a Theban victory (371 BC). During this fractious, politically fluid, and rapidly evolving time, Greeks formed alliances with Persians for action against fellow Greeks. Treachery and deceit were rampant and commonplace. The political will and foresight to form a pan-Hellenic army was totally lacking. 

Indeed, though Persia was ripe for picking and undoubtedly rotten to the core, the Greek genius could not forge the political unity necessary to enact this destruction. For all their achievements, the Greeks lacked the fundamental political nous and concerted wisdom that would characterise their ultimate conquerors, the Romans. It would take the genius of the semi-barbarous Macedonians, under Phillip and subsequently Alexander, to contrive and pound the petulant Greeks into One. But only by the power of the sword. Under Macedonian hegemony, at last, and under unified command, the Greeks were able to destroy and supplant Persian power at the battle of Gaugamela (331 BC). The Greek flair for suicidal despair imposed from within could only be countered from without.