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Read and weep
The Third Battle of Ypres in the
summer of 1917 (Passchendaele), together with the battle of the Somme is
synonymous, at least in British eyes, with the futility and mass slaughter of
the First World War, and in my opinion, rightly so.
General Haig, the commander of the
British forces had formed a picture in his mind. He envisioned a German army
close to defeat, battered by the Somme
offensive of the preceding summer. One last push to the Belgium coast
and the German army would be rolled up from the north. To achieve this end he
planned a grand summer offensive in 1917 and chose Flanders
as the field of operation. On the map Flanders
seemed the ideal place for a major British offensive. A gain of just 30 miles
would take the British to the Belgium
ports of Ostend
and Zeebrugge. The problem was that his viewpoint was not rooted in military
reality. Perhaps it was possible to reach the coast if the German army was no
longer a coherent entity. But this was certainly not the case in 1917. Indeed,
during the battle the Germans felt confident enough to transfer troops from the
front line for operations elsewhere.
Lloyd George, the British Prime
Minister, was against the offensive from the first and predicted another
'slaughter fest' without any tangible result. Haig was adamant that Ostend and other channel
ports could be reached in the first wave of the offensive. He emphasised the
parlous state of a Germany
army in disarray and imminent collapse. When Lloyd George visited the Western
Front during the battle, Haig removed all the robust looking Germans from the
prisoner of war cages to give the impression that the Germans were drawing on
their last reserves of man power. Nothing could be further from the truth.
The French allies did not support an
offensive here, nor did any of the other British Generals. As one French
General so presciently (not a real word) stated: "You can't fight both Boche and
boue" (Germans and mud). In fact it was the French army that was close to
collapse. The German attack on Verdun
in 1916 and General Nivelle's disastrous offensive in early 1917 had brought
the French army close to mutiny. The army would hold the line but further
offensive action was denied to them. The last thing the French wanted was the
British army to be ground down in the same way. It would be better to stand on
the defensive in 1917 and await for the Americans and tanks for an offensive in
1918.
As predicted, the battlefield became
a morass fuelled by summer and autumn rains. All that was needed was the ever
present artillery fire to plough and churn the land into a mud/blood bath.
Furthermore, in the north the Belgians had destroyed the dykes thus letting in
the sea. On this flank the Germans were secure. They had also built strong
defences in depth in front of the British trenches. The high water table in the
area ensured that the forth coming battle would turn into a duck-walk rather
than Haig's imaginary cake-walk.
The offensive was heralded by the
obligatory drum fire of artillery extended over several days. The battle began
on the 31st July 1917. By the end of the first day it was clear to
the British High Command that the offensive had failed. With advances of no
more than half a mile the main German line was nowhere breached. Men, tanks and
artillery simply sank and disappeared in the deep cloying mud. With no
breakthrough in sight, Haig changed his objectives. No longer would the
offensive result in the capture of Ostend
and Zeebrugge. Instead the battle would become one of attrition with the only
purpose of killing Germans. It should be remembered that the concept of attrition
is always a two way process. The battle rumbled on for a further three months
before being called off.
And so for the butcher’s bill:
British casualties- 300,000; German casualties- 200,000. Haig argued that the
Germans had suffered severely and planned a further offensive in the spring of
1918 which would bring the Germans to their knees. Again Haig was wrong. The
Germans had more than enough men left to launch their own formidable spring
offensive of 1918.
The effect on the British army was
more subtle. As one British army Sergeant sensibly put it: “We will beat them
but not before they break our hearts”. If innocence had been lost on the Somme , so enthusiasm had been lost at Passchendaele. It
was replaced by grim determination and a stark professionalism to get the job
done, but at what cost?
There is nothing glorious about war except the men in it