British Soldiers on their way to Battle
What follows is the opinion of an amateur, armchair historian. I claim no spectacular/particular insight and much of what I have to say may appear mundane to the professional. Nevertheless, this is my own perspective of 1916 after reading voluminously on the topic. Thus, I solicit, opinion, criticism and expansion, as deemed necessary. I thank thee.
By the beginning of January 1916, German arms were in the ascendant on all major theatres of battle. Belgium, except for a small northern region protected by flooding, was securely in German hands, while a great swathe of North East France was under the jackboot. In the East the Russians had not only lost Poland but also parts of ‘Mother Russia’.
On the face of it, the Entente powers did not seem to have done too well during two years of war. Constant French, and to a lesser extent British offensives on the Western Front, had shown little in the way of territorial gain while losses in men and material had been horrendous. The first five months of war in 1914 had resulted in 1,000,000 French causalities. In addition, the Western Allies had failed to knock out the despised Turks at Gallipoli and were reassessing their strategic and offensive policy for 1916. For the French there could be no talk of taking a defensive position on the Western Front. Sacred French territory demanded repatriation and this could only be achieved by the offensive.
The impressive German success was an illusion and they were well aware that their position would likely deteriorate as the war went on. Time was a ticking and as the allies grew stronger the Germans became correspondingly weaker. Thus, are the fickle vicissitudes of war. At the beginning of the war the Germans had discounted the British contribution to the Allied war effort and described the British army as ‘contemptible’. This was, ultimately, to be a grave error and was finally recognised as such by Erich Falkenhayn, the Great German Warlord.
From the first day of the war, British sea power swept German commerce from the seas. This initiated a stranglehold that would progressively stifle Germany’s access to essential war supplies and food. In addition, as the war progressed, Britain mobilised the vast men and resources of its teeming Empire. At the beginning of 1916 Britain had 36 divisions on the Western Front and more would were to be added, thus formulating a formidable army to match German power. Cracks had appeared in Germany’s chief ally, Austro-Hungary, right from the first battles of the war. The fighting effectiveness of this ethnically diverse army could only be maintained by German military force and assistance. The German’s described the alliance as being ‘fettered to a corpse’. Time was not on the German’s side and they realised that to win the war, they needed to defeat the Allies on the Western Front, preferably in 1916. But the big question for the Germans was whom to attack and where?
The Allies were aware that this war could only be concluded by thoroughly defeating the Germans on the Western Front. But how was this to be achieved? At a conference, in France, in December 1915, attended by representatives of all the Entente Powers, it had been decided that German and Austro-Hungarian forces could only be defeated by a coordinated and continuous series of assaults by all parties. Therefore, Russians on the Eastern front would attack both the German and the Austro-Hungarian fronts simultaneously. In the West the French and British would launch their own major coordinated offensive on the Somme. The Italians would attack the Austrians in the Alps. In this way, the Germans would be unable to divert divisions from other sectors to support their troops facing multiple offensives on diverse fronts. The whole Western, Southern and Eastern fronts would come alive with fire and cordite and the German troops would be overwhelmed- well that was the Allied plan and the combined attacks would occur in late spring or early summer of 1916.
On the face of it the Allied plan appeared sound. The Germans would not have the resources to resist multiple and continuous attack on geographically separated fronts. The problem with the plan, as so often occurred during the Great War, was the Allies had failed to take into account the German response. The German war machine would not be pacific and supine participants to the Allied ‘Grand Plan’ as they had decided on a ‘Grand Plan’ of their own.
On 21st February the Germans opened their own offensive against the French at Verdun. The Verdun salient snaked into French territory and was bounded by German troops on three sides. The plan was simple and terrible in conception and application. The Germans argued that for this territory the French would defend to the upmost even though retention of the salient was not of military or strategic importance. Although a liability in strategic terms, the salient held a place of honour in the French psyche and although, counter to the ‘rules of war’ and common military sense, it would be defended to the last man. This suited the German plan of battle perfectly. Initially, it had been decided to batter Verdun with massive artillery bombardments from three quarters. The idea was to bleed the French army white with little loss to the Germans. The ‘mill on the Meuse’ would continue for a bloody nine months during which most French army units would be involved, albeit in rotation. Few soldiers were spared the maelstrom. Initially, at least, the German plan did not involve the taking of territory, the sole aim of killing Frenchmen was deemed sufficient. However, after some initial success in taking several fortresses, the German plan evolved and it was decided that killing Frenchmen was not enough and the reduction of the salient became paramount. This was a bad mistake and the Germans should have stuck to their original plan of using artillery ordinance to destroy the French army. The Germans did not achieve their objective, but they came very close. By the end of the battle the French had suffered 337,321 causalities. However, due to the German change in plan, they suffered almost the same level of dead, wounded and captured.
The British offensive on the Somme scheduled for July 1st now had an urgent spur as the beleaguered French were exhorting the British to start the offensive early in order to relieve pressure on Verdun. Due to logistic factors the British attack could not be brought forward. And while it is true that the British action on the 1st July did help the French position to a limited extent, the Germans had decided to wind down their Verdun offensive anyway.
Originally the French had planned to attack on the Somme in force, adjacent to the British front with an equal number of divisions. But because of the scale of French involvement at Verdun, they could only spare six divisions for the day. The heat of the Verdun caldron had scalded the French army almost unto death.
On the Eastern front, to coincide with the British and French attack, the Russians initiated their offensive against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in June. In addition, as planned, the Italians also attacked the Austrians in force. The consequences of these combined offensives will not be discussed here.
By 31st of December, 1916, the Germans still appeared to be ‘winning’. But this was an illusion that would be exposed during the bitter fighting of 1917. During 1917 the German war position was becoming precarious. This was finally acknowledged by the Germans themselves, and although wise heads amongst the allies also recognised Germany's’ growing weakness and war weariness, they also conceded that there was a lot more killing to be done before the proud German nation was defeated.
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